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 1 
“Libel Tourism” and Conflict of Laws 
Trevor C Hartley* 
 
Libel tourism is much in the news these days – so much so, that it is even the subject of a 
Wikipedia entry.
1
 It is defined in Wikipedia as a type of forum shopping in which a 
claimant chooses to bring a libel action in the jurisdiction thought most likely to give a 
favourable result. This invariably turns out to be England. At present, there is a media 
campaign, originating in the United States but echoed in England, claiming that libel 
tourism is undermining free speech.
2
 The purpose of this note is to consider whether 
these claims are justified. Only questions of conflict of laws will be discussed.
3
 
 
I. THE PROBLEM 
 
We all believe in free speech. We also believe that people should be protected from 
defamation. There is a potential conflict between these two values and the law has to 
attempt some kind of balance. In some countries, the balance tilts in favour of free 
speech; in others, it tilts in favour of protecting reputation. England is one of the most 
extreme members of the latter category: English libel law is generally regarded as the 
                                                 
* Professor of Law Emeritus, London School of Economics. 
1
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libel_tourism. 
2
 See, for example, United Kingdom Parliament, Hansard, 17 December 2008: Column 69WH; The Times 
(London), 18 December 2008, p. 27; The New York Times, 26 May 2009 (editorial). Libel tourism is 
apparently being considered by the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, a standing committee of the 
House of Commons chaired by John Whittingdale MP. 
3
 The leading treatment of the subject in England is Morse, “Rights Relating to Personality, Freedom of the 
Press and Private International Law: Some Common Law Comments” (2005) 58 Current Legal Problems 
133. 
 
 2 
most claimant-friendly in the world. Under it, the claimant has a prima facie case once he 
has established that the defendant has published a defamatory statement about him. He 
does not have to prove that the statement is false (though the defendant has a good 
défense if he can prove it is true) and he does not have to prove that the defendant acted 
out of malice. Damages can be high by international standards. No wonder that the rich 
and the famous come from the four corners of the globe to bring libel actions in England.  
 
 The problem is that if English courts assume jurisdiction in too wide a range of 
cases (and if they apply English law), countries that give more weight to free speech 
could legitimately complain that the English courts were undermining their freedoms. 
Our first task, therefore, is to examine English conflict-of-laws rules in libel actions in 
order to ascertain whether they achieve a fair balance between the competing interests. 
 
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
The problem has both a choice-of-law element and a jurisdictional element. We will 
consider the choice-of-law element first, though, as we shall see, jurisdiction is actually 
more important. Before we consider either, however, a point of terminology must be 
explained. 
 
A. Terminology 
 
 3 
In English legal terminology, each time an item is communicated to another person, there is 
a “publication”. Each sale of a newspaper is a separate publication in English eyes; and each 
time a viewer watches a television program there is also a “publication”.4 The place of 
publication is the place where this occurs. If a French newspaper sells even a single copy in 
England, there is publication in England (as well as in France); the same is true if a French 
radio station makes a broadcast that is heard in England. Lawyers from Continental Europe 
usually use different terminology. They would say that the French newspaper was 
“published” in France and was merely “distributed” in England.5 Readers from the 
Continent should be aware that English lawyers use these terms differently. 
 
B. No “Single-Publication” Rule 
 
Unlike the United States,
6
 England does not apply a “single-publication” rule. The principle 
that each communication of the offending material constitutes a separate tort applies with 
regard to choice of law, jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. This means that the 
applicable law may be different with regard to publication in different countries and that the 
English courts may have jurisdiction with regard to those torts founded on publication in 
England, but not with regard to those torts founded on publication in other countries.  
 
C. Choice of Law 
 
                                                 
4
 Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer (1849) 14 QB 185. 
5
 For this reason, the European Court of Justice did not use the words, “publish”, “publication”, etc. in the 
Shevill case (discussed below). 
6
 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 465 US 770; 104 S Ct 1473; 79 L Ed. 2d 790 (US Supreme Court, 
1984). 
 4 
In England, choice of law in tort was codified by the Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995; however, defamation was excluded from this 
statute.
7
 Subsequently, choice of law in tort was almost entirely taken over by EC law,
8
 
but again defamation was excluded.
9
 The result is that the common law still applies. 
Under the general common-law rule applied in England for choice of law in tort, a tort 
committed in a foreign country will be actionable in England if, and only if, it is 
actionable under the foreign law (it must be civilly actionable: it is not enough if is a 
criminal offence) and it is actionable as a tort under English law (the so-called “double-
actionability” rule).10 Where the tort is committed in England, on the other hand, English 
law alone will be applied.
11
 
 
 It follows from this, that if the claimant limits his claim to a remedy for 
publication in England – as he invariably does, for jurisdictional reasons if for no others – 
the court will apply English law alone. Foreign publication, even if much more 
significant than English publication, will be ignored. This is one of the consequences of 
the English concept of publication and the view that each publication constitutes a 
separate tort. 
 
D. Jurisdiction 
 
                                                 
7
 Sections 9(3), 10 and 13. 
8
 The Rome II Regulation, EC Regulation 864/2007, OJ 2007, L190/40. 
9
 Article 1(2)(g). 
10
 Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 14
th
 edn, 2006 by Sir 
Lawrence Collins with specialist editors) (hereinafter “Dicey, Morris & Collins”), Rule 235, pp. 1957 et 
seq. 
11
 Dicey, Morris & Collins, p. 1960, text to, and cases cited in, note 2. 
 5 
Since there cannot be (and is not) any objection to actions being brought in England 
when the defendant is domiciled
12
 in England or in another part of the United Kingdom, 
we shall focus on the position where he is domiciled outside the UK. Where he is 
domiciled in another EU Member State,
13
 the jurisdiction of the English courts is 
determined by EU law (the Brussels I Regulation).
14
 Where he is not domiciled in any 
such State, the present position is that English rules of jurisdiction apply (this may 
change when the Brussels I Regulation is revised). We consider each of these situations 
separately. 
 
 1. Defendant domiciled in a Member State 
 
The leading case in EU law is Shevill v. Presse Alliance SA.
15
  In this case, a claimant 
domiciled in England (together with her French employer) brought a libel action in 
England against a French newspaper. The newspaper, France Soir, sold approximately 
200,000 copies in France; in England it sold something in the region of 250. There was no 
evidence that anyone who had read the article knew the claimant or her employer. The 
claimants, who limited their claim to damages for the copies sold in England, asserted that 
the English courts had jurisdiction under what is now Article 5(3) of the Brussels I 
                                                 
12
 In this paper, “domicile” is used in the sense in which it applies for the purpose of jurisdiction under the 
Brussels I Regulation. See The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Order 2001, SI 2001 No. 3929, paragraph 
9 (individuals) and the Brussels I Regulation, Article 60 (companies). This concept is not very different 
from residence, or domicile as applied in the United States. It is much more flexible than the traditional 
English concept of domicile. 
13
 The position is the same when the defendant is domiciled in a State Party to the Lugano Convention, a 
convention signed in the Swiss city of Lugano on 16 September 1988. The original text of the Lugano 
Convention may be found in OJ 1988, L 319, p. 25. The Parties to the Lugano Convention have fluctuated 
over time; at present the non-EU Parties (often referred to as the “Lugano States”) are Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland. Henceforth, references to a Member State of the EU should be regarded as including 
references to a Lugano State. 
14
 Regulation 44/2001, OJ 2001, L 12/1. 
15
 Case C-68/93, [1995] ECR I-415. 
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Regulation,
16
 a provision which confers jurisdiction on the courts for the place where the 
“harmful event” occurred. 
 
 The European Court held that, in international libel cases in which jurisdiction is 
claimed under Article 5(3), the claimant may bring proceedings either in the courts for the 
place where the material is distributed or in the courts for the place where the publisher is 
“established”. This latter concept will generally coincide with domicile and need not 
concern us further. Where jurisdiction is based on distribution (publication), the claim must 
be limited to damage flowing from the copies of the publication distributed in the territory of 
the forum.  
 
 2. Defendant not domiciled in a Member State  
 
At present, English rules of jurisdiction apply when the defendant is not domiciled in a 
Member State. Under these, jurisdiction may be obtained either by serving a writ on the 
defendant during his temporary presence in England (a ground of jurisdiction that rarely 
applies in libel cases),
17
 or by serving it outside the jurisdiction under Section IV, Part 6, of 
the English Civil Procedure Rules and Practice Direction 6B, rule 3(1)(9). Rule 3(1)(9), 
which was derived from ECJ case-law,
18
 provides for jurisdiction, where the claim is made 
in tort, if either (a) damage was sustained within the jurisdiction, or (b) the damage 
                                                 
16
 At the time, the relevant provision was Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention, which was expressed in 
identical terms. 
17
 If there was no publication in England, the action would be stayed on the ground of forum non 
conveniens. If there was such publication, the same thing would probably happen unless the claim was 
limited to damages resulting from publication in England. 
18
 Bier v. Mines de Potasse, Case 21/76, [1976] ECR 1735. 
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sustained resulted from an act committed within the jurisdiction. As applied to libel, it 
gives jurisdiction only with regard to items published (distributed) in England.
19
 The 
result is that the jurisdictional rules are much the same under both EU law and under 
English law. 
 
 There is, however, one difference. Where jurisdiction is derived from English 
law, the doctrine of forum non conveniens applies.
20
 Under this, English courts stay the 
proceedings if the courts of another country are a clearly more appropriate forum. 
However, if the claimant limits his claim to a remedy for publication in England, the 
English courts will apply forum non conveniens solely on the basis of such publication.
 21
 
Publication outside England will not be taken into consideration. Since England does not 
have a “single-publication” rule, the English courts will not lump together all instances in 
which the material is communicated and apply forum non conveniens on that basis.
22
 The 
result is that the courts inevitably conclude that England is the most appropriate forum for 
granting a remedy for publication in England.  
 
 The only exception is where the claimant has no substantial reputation in 
England. However, libel claimants are usually international business persons, film stars, 
pop singers or sportsmen: if they do not have a great deal of money they will not be able 
                                                 
19
 If publication in England was minimal, the court might strike out the proceedings for abuse of process: 
Jameel (Yousef) v. Dow Jones & Co Inc. [2005] QB 946; [2005] 2 WLR 1614 (CA). This remedy would 
probably be applicable even if the English court had jurisdiction under EC law, since it is not based on 
jurisdictional considerations. 
20
 Forum non conveniens cannot apply where the jurisdiction of the English court is derived from EC law: 
Owusu v. Jackson, Case C-281/02, [2005] ECR I-1383; [2005] QB 801; [2005] 2 WLR 942; [2005] 2 All 
ER (Comm.) 577; [2005] 1 Lloyd's Rep 452 (ECJ). 
21
 King v. Lewis [2004] EWCA Civ 1329 (CA). 
22
 Berezovsky v. Michaels [2000] 1 WLR 1004; [2000] 2 All ER 986 (HL). See per Lord Steyn [2000] 1 
WLR at pp. 1012–1013. 
 8 
to afford to bring proceedings in England. Such people can usually claim to have a 
reputation in England. In the case of business persons, they would have to show that they 
had business interests in England. If they did, they would not have to show that they were 
widely known, simply that they were known to the particular group of business people 
with whom they normally carried on business.
23
 For these reasons, forum non conveniens, 
though useful in some cases, has only a limited effect.  
 
III. ASSESSMENT 
 
We are now in a position to assess whether criticisms concerning libel tourism are 
justified. At first sight, it might seem that there are not. English courts claim jurisdiction 
only when there is publication (distribution) of the offending material in England, and the 
remedy must be limited to harm resulting from that material. Who could complain about 
that? 
 
 Unfortunately things are not so simple. The first problem concerns the concept of 
publication. English courts take the view that material on the Internet is published in 
England whenever it can be downloaded in England. There is no requirement of 
targeting. Since all material on the Internet can normally be downloaded anywhere, this 
means that all material on the Internet is regarded as being published in England.
24
 
Almost all major newspapers, news magazines, news agencies and TV networks have an 
                                                 
23
 Persons in the entertainment industry would have to show that they had fans in England or that their 
work was marketed here. 
24
 King v. Lewis [2004] EWCA Civ 1329 (CA). A similar rule applies in the Commonwealth: Dow Jones & 
Co Inc. v. Gutnick (2003) 210 CLR 575; 77 ALJR 255; 194 ALR 433 (High Court of Australia).  
 9 
Internet edition, available from their websites.
25
 This means that, in the case of 
newspaper and TV reports, as well as other Internet material, the requirement of 
publication in England is meaningless. Moreover, most printed books are available from 
Internet suppliers, such as Amazon.
26
 They too can be regarded as published everywhere. 
For these reasons, it is fair to say that the requirement of publication in England no longer 
constitutes a significant safeguard against exorbitant jurisdiction. Thus, for example, if 
one American resident puts material on the Internet that allegedly libels another 
American resident, the latter may sue for libel in England, provided he has a reputation 
there.
27
  
 
 This might still not be regarded as a problem since, under both EC and English 
law, the remedy must be limited to damages resulting from publication in England. The 
problem is that it is not possible in practice to limit the scope of the remedy so that it does 
not have an impact on publication in other countries. In the realm of information, the 
world is one unit: individual countries cannot be isolated from the rest.  
 
 The case of Bin Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld
28
 provides an example. Rachel Ehrenfeld 
was an Israeli-American who wrote books on terrorism. In one of her books, she claimed 
that Khalid Mahfouz, an eminent Saudi businessman, was responsible for financing 
international terrorism.  The book was published in the US. It seems that it was not 
                                                 
25
 In the case of France Soir, it is http://www.francesoir.fr/. So if the Shevill case occurred today, it would 
not be necessary to show that any copies of the newspaper had been distributed in England. 
26
 For the US, see http://www.Amazon.com; for England, see http://www.Amazon.co.uk; for France, 
http://www.Amazon.fr. 
27
 King v. Lewis [2004] EWCA Civ 1329 (CA). In this case, the claimant, Don King, was an American 
boxing promoter, who had promoted boxing matches in England. This was held to be sufficient. 
28
 [2005] EWHC 1156 (QB). 
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marketed in the United Kingdom: Ehrenfeld claimed that she and her publisher, an 
American firm, had never taken any steps to make it available there. However, a number 
of copies were sold via the Internet in England – the judgment mentioned 23 – and the 
first chapter was available on an American website which could be accessed in 
England.
29
  
 
 Mahfouz and his two sons brought proceedings in England for libel against 
Ehrenfeld and her publisher. Jurisdiction was based on publication in England. Ehrenfeld 
did not defend – she claimed she did not have the financial resources to do so30 – and a 
default judgment was obtained. A declaration of falsity was made, and the claimants 
(Mahfouz and his two sons) were granted damages of £10,000 each. Ehrenfeld was also 
ordered to pay costs. The total sum is said to have been almost £115,000 (at the then 
exchange rate this was something in the region of $200,000, more than €135,000). In 
addition, an injunction was issued requiring Ehrenfeld and her publisher not to publish 
the material in England. 
 
 Since the damages awarded – for the distribution of just 23 copies of the book – 
were far greater than the likely profits from publication worldwide, the effect of the 
award, if known in advance, would have been to deter the author from publishing at all. 
Moreover, the defendants were ordered not to publish the material in England. This 
injunction would have required the material not to be put on the Internet and hard copies 
                                                 
29
 ABCNews.com. 
30
 Nevertheless, she was subsequently able to bring quite lengthy proceedings against Mahfouz in New 
York, a jurisdiction where attorney fees do not seem to be any lower than in England. See Ehrenfeld v. 
Mahfouz, note 33*, below. 
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not to be sold through on-line booksellers like Amazon. This would have had a severe 
impact on marketing in other countries.
31
 For these reasons, a remedy granted for 
publication in England will almost always have an impact on freedom to publish in other 
countries. The requirement that the remedy be limited to compensation for distribution in 
England is virtually meaningless. 
 
 Although the Ehrenfeld case resulted in legal proceedings (undefended though 
they were), many cases do not get that far. Defendants give in at the mere threat of a law 
suit. It has been said that wealthy businessmen in East European countries, including 
some EU Member States, have found the threat of libel proceedings in England to be an 
effective means of securing the removal from websites in their countries of material that 
reveals corrupt activities on their part.
32
 If proceedings were brought, the defendants 
would be unable to defend themselves because they could not afford the fees charged by 
London lawyers. So they have no option but to back down. 
 
 One can conclude from this that libel tourism is a genuine problem. Libel 
proceedings, or the threat of libel proceedings, in England can unjustifiably undermine 
free speech in other countries.  
 
IV. REACTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
                                                 
31
 In fact, Ehrenfeld did not obey the judgment, and no attempt was made to enforce it in the United States, 
where it would almost certainly have been refused recognition. So Ehrenfeld and her publisher were able to 
continue marketing the book there. The position would have been different, however, if she or her publisher 
had had assets in the United Kingdom (or another EU Member State), which would be the case with most 
major American publishers. In any event, it is hardly a recommendation for a ground of jurisdiction that it 
does no harm as long as the resulting judgments are not enforced in other countries. 
32
 Information supplied at a conference held at the London School of Economics on 20 January 2009. 
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After the proceedings in the English courts, Ehrenfeld sued in a federal court in New 
York (SDNY) for a declaration that, under federal and New York law, Mahfouz could not 
prevail on a libel claim against her based upon the statements at issue in the English 
action and that the English default judgment was unenforceable in the United States. 
Mahfouz claimed that the American courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. This claim 
was upheld by the New York Court of Appeals, to which the matter was referred by the 
Second Circuit: Mahfouz lacked sufficient contacts with New York to justify the 
assertion of jurisdiction.
33
 
 
 Her next step was to get legislation adopted by the New York State Legislature. 
This is rather provocatively entitled “The Libel Terrorism (sic) Protection Act”.34 It 
amends the New York legislation for the recognition of foreign judgments to provide that 
a foreign defamation judgment will not be recognized unless the defamation law applied 
by the foreign court provided at least as much protection for free speech as would be 
provided by the Constitutions of the United States and New York. The legislation also 
confers jurisdiction on the New York courts to hear actions brought by New York 
residents (and certain other persons) for declaratory judgments
35
 against persons who 
have obtained defamation judgments against them in foreign countries.
36
 Similar 
legislation has been passed in some other states. 
 
                                                 
33
 Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz 9 NY 3d 501; 881 NE 2d 830; 851 NYS 2d 381 (2007). 
34
 Laws of New York, 2008, Chapter 66. 
35
 Including a declaration that the defamation judgment will not be recognized in New York. 
36
 The constitutionality of this jurisdictional provision may be open to question. 
 13 
 Bills have been introduced in the US Congress for a Free Speech Protection Act.
37
 
If enacted as they stand, they would allow a “United States person”38 against whom a 
defamation judgment has been obtained in a foreign country to bring proceedings in the 
United States to obtain declaratory relief, injunctions, compensatory damages and, in 
certain cases, treble damages against the person who brought the defamation proceedings.  
 
V. A FAIR BALANCE 
 
It will be seen from the above that English libel laws have given rise to an international 
problem. One solution would be to change the substantive law of libel in England. This 
may happen one day, but it is unlikely to come about as the result of international 
concerns. For the present time at least, a solution must be found through conflict of laws. 
For this, we must accept that all countries are entitled to their own views on the balance 
between free speech and the protection of reputation. The objective of conflict of laws is 
to ensure that one country does not impose its views on others. A solution could be found 
either through choice of law or through jurisdiction. At this point, we need not choose 
between them: our first task is simply to analyze the competing interests. In doing this, 
we will take the example of the United States as a country which gives significantly 
greater protection to free speech (compared with defamation) than England.
39
  
 
                                                 
37
 Similar, but not identical, bills were introduced in the House of Representatives (HR 5814) on 16 April 
2008 and the Senate (S 449) on 13 February 2009.  
38
 Defined, in slightly different terms, in section 6(5) of the House bill and 5(6) of the Senate bill. 
39
 For this purpose, it is reasonable to regard the United States as a single unit, rather than to look at the 
individual US state in question, since the protection of free speech, being largely a matter of constitutional 
law, is a national concern. If individual states gave even greater protection, a further analysis at the state 
level might be necessary.  
 14 
 The first situation is the easiest one. If the claimant is domiciled in the United 
States and the defendant is domiciled in England, there is no problem. The United States 
has no interest in the protection of the free speech of a person domiciled in England. If 
English courts want to take jurisdiction and to apply English law, that does not affect 
American interests. There is, therefore, no need to change the law in this situation. 
 
 If, on the other hand, the claimant and defendant are both domiciled in the United 
States, the US has a great interest in protecting the free speech of the defendant and 
England has no interest in protecting the reputation of the claimant. So here, American 
interests should prevail. The only exception is that if the defendant goes out of his or her 
way to target England so that publication is England is clearly more significant than that 
in any other country of the world, England would have a legitimate interest in granting a 
remedy, at least if the defendant had a significant reputation in England.  
 
 A similar analysis could be made where the defendant is domiciled in the United 
States and the claimant is domiciled in a third country, except perhaps where a fair trial 
could not be expected in the claimant’s country. 
 
 We now come to the most difficult situation. This is where the claimant is 
domiciled in England and the defendant is domiciled in the US. Here each country has a 
legitimate interest in protecting its own person. The United States would want to protect 
the free speech of the defendant; England would want to protect the reputation of the 
claimant. No reconciliation is possible. Provided there is publication in England, English 
 15 
courts would take jurisdiction and apply English law. They cannot be criticized for that. 
American courts would refuse to recognize the resulting judgment (and possibly grant 
declarations). They cannot be criticized for that. To this extent, legislation such as that in 
New York is not unreasonable.
40
 
 
 What can we conclude from this analysis? It is suggested that the law applied by 
English courts (whether English or EU law) should be changed so as to give effect to the 
superior interest of foreign countries in cases where neither party is domiciled in England 
and the defendant has not specially targeted England. 
 
VI. HOW IS THIS TO BE DONE? 
 
Finding a practical solution is not straightforward, since two branches of conflict of laws 
– choice of law and jurisdiction – are involved, and two jurisdictions – England and the 
European Union – might have to take action.  
 
A. Choice of Law 
 
                                                 
40
 Treble damages, however, are another matter. Legislation along these lines would invite retaliation. The 
vehicle for such retaliation is already at hand. Section 6 of the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 
contains a “claw-back” provision allowing a person who has been required to pay treble damages in 
another country to claim them back from the person to whom they were paid. Any such judgment would be 
recognized in the European Union, the Lugano States (see note 13*, above), and Australia. For the 
European Union, see the Brussels I Regulation, Chapter III; for the Lugano States, the equivalent 
provisions of the Lugano Convention (see note 13*, above); for Australia, the Foreign Proceedings (Excess 
of Jurisdiction) Act 1984, section 12. 
 16 
At the present time, a solution based on choice of law would have to come from England, 
since the matter is at present governed by English law. However, the EU measure on 
choice of law in tort (the Rome II Regulation)
41
 should in principle cover choice of law 
for defamation. It was excluded only because it was impossible to find a solution that was 
acceptable to all concerned. This is not the end of the matter, however, since the EC 
Commission is supposed to be undertaking a study with a view to further legislation.
42
 
One day, a solution might be found and incorporated into the Regulation. 
 
 It is not easy to formulate a clear-cut rule – the kind preferred by Continental 
conflicts lawyers – for insertion into the Rome II Regulation. Of the various possibilities 
originally considered, the application of the law of the claimant’s domicile had some 
initial support. However, it proved unacceptable because of the serious problems that 
could result: for example, it might be impossible for the press to criticize a foreign 
dictator if the law of his country declared that any such criticism was ipso facto 
defamatory. 
 
 If a solution were to come from a change of English law, a more nuanced 
approach would be possible. Perhaps the best one could come up with would be a rule 
such as the following:  
 
                                                 
41
 Note 8*, above. 
42
 The Commission was supposed to report by the end of 2008: see Article 30(2) of the Regulation. This did 
not happen and it is unlikely that a solution will be found in the near future. 
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(a) The provisions of this [section] shall apply for the purpose of determining the applicable law in 
proceedings for defamation in which the defendant is not domiciled in any part of the United 
Kingdom. 
 
(b) For the purpose of this [section], all instances of publication of defamatory material anywhere 
in the world shall be treated as a single tort and given equal weight, even if the claim is restricted 
to a remedy for publication in the United Kingdom or some part thereof. 
 
(c) The applicable law for the tort of defamation shall be the law of the country with which the tort 
is most closely connected. 
 
While admittedly vague, this at least requires the court to consider the worldwide picture, 
even if the claim is limited to publication in England. In effect, it establishes a single-
publication rule for choice of law. A rule along these lines might one day be introduced 
by the courts, though this is far from certain. If legislation were to be adopted, it would 
have to be a statute, since there is no other way in which it could be done. The problem 
here is that the legislative timetable in Parliament is usually congested with more urgent 
business and “mere” law reform is often pushed to the back of the queue.  
 
 In addition, a solution through choice of law gives rise to other difficulties. The 
first is that, in a field such as defamation, values and attitudes are often as important as 
the black-letter rule. Moreover, English judges might be unwilling to apply some aspects 
of US law on public-policy grounds. For these reasons, US law applied by an English 
court might be significantly different from US law applied by an American court. 
 
 18 
 A second problem is that the vague and open-ended character of the rule could 
give rise to extensive litigation. Many defendants might be unable to afford this. If a 
foreign defendant is financially unable to defend a case on the merits, he or she is 
unlikely to be able to fight a series of appeals on choice-of-law issues. For these reasons, 
a solution through choice of law is unlikely to prove satisfactory. 
 
B. Jurisdiction 
 
At present, EU law (the Brussels I Regulation)
43
 applies only when the defendant is 
domiciled in an EU Member State. So a change here would not do much to help 
defendants from the US or other non-European countries. However, there is a plan to 
extend its scope to cover at least some situations in which the defendant is domiciled 
outside the EU. If this happens, EU law may become the main focus of attention for 
finding a solution to the problem of libel tourism. 
 
 1. EU law 
 
If a change to EU law were contemplated, it would not be possible to find a solution 
through forum non conveniens, since its unpredictability makes it unacceptable to EU 
lawyers. Nor would a flexible jurisdictional rule be acceptable. Something clear-cut and 
precise would have to be devised. As was said above, there are two provisions that could 
apply to defamation proceedings. The first, Article 2(1), gives jurisdiction to the Member 
                                                 
43
 Note 14*, above. 
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State in which the defendant is domiciled. Since this causes no problems, it does not have 
to be changed. 
 
 The second is Article 5(3), which was discussed above.
44
 This gives jurisdiction 
to the courts for the place where the “harmful event” occurred. This should be retained, but 
it should be limited in the case of defamation. The following is a possibility:  
 
In the case of non-contractual obligations45 arising out of violations of privacy 
and rights relating to personality, including defamation,46 Article 5(3) shall 
apply only if –  
 
(a)  the claimant is domiciled in the territory of the forum; or  
 
(b)  the defendant has taken significant steps to make the offending 
material available in the country of the forum and has targeted 
that country more than any other. 
 
This would apply in addition to jurisdiction based on the domicile of the defendant. 
 
 2. English law 
 
Under English law, a solution could be found either through a change in the way in which 
forum non conveniens is applied, or by a change in the rules of jurisdiction. As regards 
forum non conveniens, the problem is that, if the claim is limited to a remedy for publication 
                                                 
44
 See text to note 16.* 
45
 “Non-contractual obligations” is the term used in EU law. Its main component is tort, though it covers 
other matters as well. 
46
 This is the definition used in the Rome II Regulation for the purpose of excluding libel actions. See note 
9* above and the text thereto. 
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in England, the courts take into account only such publication.
 47
 What is needed is some 
kind of single-publication rule for this purpose. This might be introduced through a change 
in case law: the present rule rests on decisions of the House of Lords and the Court of 
Appeal;
48
 these could be overruled by the House of Lords. If legislation were to be adopted, 
this could probably be done through an amendment to the Civil Procedure Rules, something 
that would be much easier to do than to pass a statute. As regards a change in the rules of 
jurisdiction, an amendment could be made to Practice Direction 6B, rule 3(1)(9),
49
 perhaps 
along the lines of the proposed amendment to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation.
50
 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
What has been said shows that a reasonable solution to the problem is possible. However, 
it is unlikely that legislation would be introduced either in England or in the European 
Union unless there is a clearly felt need to do so. This is unlikely to be the case unless 
those affected make out a case on the political level. 
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 See text to notes 20–23*, above. 
48
 Berezovsky v. Michaels [2000] 1 WLR 1004; [2000] 2 All ER 986 (HL) (especially per Lord Steyn 
[2000] 1 WLR at pp. 1012–1013); King v. Lewis [2004] EWCA Civ 1329 (CA). 
49
 See text to notes 17 and 18*, above. 
50
 See text to notes 44–47*, above. 
